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Abstract:  What is a low-carbon pathway? To many, it is a way of mitigating climate change.  16 
To others, it is about addressing market failure or capturing the co-benefits attached to low-17 
carbon systems, such as jobs or improved health. To still others, it represents building adaptive 18 
capacity and resilience in the face of climate change.  However, these interpretations can fail 19 
to acknowledge how pathways of low-carbon transitions can also become intertwined with 20 
processes and structures of inequality, exclusion and injustice.  Using a critical lens that draws 21 
from a variety of disciplines, this article explores three ways through which responses to 22 
climate change can entrench, exacerbate or reconfigure the power of elites.  As society attempts 23 
to create a low-carbon society, including for example via coastal protection efforts, disaster 24 
recovery, or climate change mitigation and renewable energy, these efforts intersect with at 25 
least three processes of elite power: experimentation, financialisation, and dispossession. 26 
Experimentation is when elites use the world as a laboratory to test or pilot low-carbon 27 
technologies or policy models, transferring risks yet not always sharing benefits.  28 
Financialisation refers to the expansion and proliferation of finance, capital, and financial 29 
markets in the global economy and many national economies, processes of which have recently 30 
extended to renewable energy. Dispossession is when elites use decarbonisation as a process 31 
through which to appropriate land, wealth, or other assets (and in the process make society 32 
more majoritarian and/or unequal).  We explore these three themes using a variety of evidence 33 
across illustrative case studies, including hard and soft coastal protection measures 34 
(Bangladesh, Netherlands), climate risk insurance (Malawi), and renewable energy auctions 35 
and associated processes of finance and investment (South Africa and Mexico).   36 
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Processes of elite power and low-carbon pathways: Experimentation, financialisation, 53 
and dispossession 54 
1. Introduction 55 
Avoiding dangerous climate change will require a transformation of national and global 56 
energy systems by 2030, if not earlier (Rockström et al. 2017). As many have argued, this will 57 
involve far-reaching social and economic changes, including disruption to transport systems, 58 
decarbonizing electricity generation, reducing consumption, and shifting economic activity 59 
towards the delivery of services rather than products (Green and Denniss 2018; Creutzig et al. 60 
2018; Geels et al. 2018).  The rate and scale of change required is best described as 61 
revolutionary: there are few historical precedents and progress to date has been limited (Geels 62 
et al. 2017). This transformation will require large institutions, industrial players, systemic 63 
structures, governments, households and individuals to: adopt a range of low-carbon 64 
technologies (e.g. electric vehicles, energy storage, heat pumps, smart homes); reduce and 65 
change energy-consuming behaviors and lifestyles in significant ways (e.g. in transport and 66 
food choices); support ambitious climate policies (e.g. carbon pricing, material efficiency 67 
measures and stringent energy efficiency standards, and geoengineering projects); and accept 68 
far-reaching changes in local and national energy systems (e.g. widespread diffusion of wind 69 
turbines, district heating, solar farms).  70 
Using a critical lens that draws from political ecology, political economy, and other 71 
disciplines, this article explores how low-carbon measures—such as coastal protection, climate 72 
risk insurance, and climate change mitigation via renewable energy—can end up being guided, 73 
shaped, and coopted by elite processes and institutions in positions of socio-economic, 74 
technocratic and/or political dominance (Bonds 2016). In this way, low-carbon measures and 75 
the pathways they promote can compound existing injustices and inequalities and consolidate 76 
wealth.  In particular our analysis focuses on the following three elite processes:  77 
• Experimentation: using peripheral spaces (geographically, socio-economically, or 78 
politically) as a laboratory to test climate change solutions or low-carbon 79 
technologies, transferring risks there but not always the benefits (Paprocki 2018);  80 
• Financialisation: the expansion and proliferation of financial instruments, 81 
innovations, logics, and markets within the global economy and many national 82 
economies. Commonly described as “the increasing role of financial motives, 83 
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financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 84 
domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005:3), we examine how 85 
financialisation has extended into the realm of climate change adaptation and 86 
mitigation. 87 
• Dispossession: often an outcome of experimentation and financialisation, this sees 88 
climate change measures as dispossessing others of their land, wealth, political and 89 
economic participation or other assets, exacerbating inequalities in the process 90 
(Paprocki 2018; Sovacool 2018).  91 
After describing our conceptual approach and explaining our methods, we explore these three 92 
processes at both national and global levels. Firstly, we examine the implementation of coastal 93 
protection measures in Bangladesh and the Netherlands. Secondly, we analyze climate risk 94 
insurance as a mechanism of climate change adaptation, with Malawi as a case study. Thirdly, 95 
we look at processes of renewable energy finance, drawing from case studies in Mexico and 96 
South Africa.   97 
 In pursuing this approach, our aim is to make at least two contributions.  First, we both 98 
integrate and extend beyond existing discussions of elites or inequality that often center 99 
importantly, but more narrowly, on the politics of knowledge production or technology 100 
transfer. Demeritt (2001) and Friman and Linner (2008) for example note how climate science 101 
has political undertones and has tended to privilege European and North American institutions 102 
but not ways of knowing in the Global South. Bonds (2010) explores how elites in the United 103 
States shape the environmental policy process by funding institutions or suppressing and 104 
manipulating information. Another body of scholarship focuses on inequality and elitism 105 
within international climate negotiations under efforts such as the United Nations Framework 106 
Convention on Climate Change (Najam et al. 2003; Gordon 2007; Schroeder et al. 2012).  107 
Others discuss patterns of technology transfer that cement unequal positions in the world 108 
economy, as they consolidate expertise among wealthy countries, and hamper the rate of 109 
technical development on things like climate change adaptation (Baumgartner et al. 2015; 110 
Callaway 2014), or act as an instrument for pollution and resource extraction (Jorgenson et al. 111 
2014).  One very recent study discusses how elites can come to view vulnerable groups as 112 
threats and then weaponize and securitize social responses to them (Thomas and Warner 2019).   113 
These threads are all salient yet seemingly disparate and disconnected—we seek to offer a more 114 
holistic discussion of elites which centers on active pathways as well as varying types. In doing 115 
so we make an empirical contribution in showing the roles of elites within different climate 116 
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change sectors, as well as making a conceptual contribution highlighting the role of different 117 
elites.  118 
 Second, we seek to insert a degree of caution and restraint amidst narratives of climate 119 
urgency (Partridge et al. 2018; Baumler et al. 2012; Kerr 2007) and climate emergency 120 
(Kunstler, 2007; Markusson et al. 2014). While a case can be made that climate change is 121 
urgent, we must be perpetually aware that the social responses to it can also entrench elitism 122 
and generate “sacrifice zones” (Healy et al. 2019).  In the rush to combat climate change, 123 
especially amidst calls to mobilize action similar to war (Delina and Diesendorf 2013; Delina 124 
2016), we must be cognizant of shifting power and control in ways we may not otherwise allow 125 
(Kester and Sovacool 2017).  Our discussion of elites and low-carbon pathways is expressly 126 
intended to shape more reflective and socially just responses, to ensure urgency is matched 127 
with considerations of equity. 128 
2. Conceptualizing elite individuals, institutions, and processes in climate change pathways  129 
At the center of our conceptual approach is the notion of elites.  By elites, we mean 130 
individuals, institutions or processes that have significant power and/or exert dominance in 131 
society.  Scott (2008: 30) argues that “elites are those groups that hold or exercise domination 132 
within a society or within a particular area of social life.” Weiss (2005) offers a spatial 133 
categorization of elites based on their mobility or scale: transnational elites are spatially 134 
autonomous and have the capacity to move seamlessly around the world and profit from 135 
global flows of capital. An example here would be the financial investor George Soros or 136 
Microsoft founder Bill Gates. National elites are more dependent on institutions of the nation 137 
state and its systems of regulation or lack thereof and profit mostly from institutional and/or 138 
physical infrastructure within a country. An example here would be national 139 
parliamentarians. Local elites have varying access to national or global flows of wealth but 140 
still retain authority or hegemony within a smaller community or region, e.g. a tribal elder or 141 
village leader.  142 
In his comprehensive volumes on the history of power, Mann (2012a, 2012b) classifies 143 
four processes, or sources, of power - ideological, economic, military, and political. Drawing 144 
on and extending this logic, we argue that such categories can be tied to four categories of 145 
elite power as follows: 146 
• Technical elites (scientists, engineers, researchers) can use the values of progress or 147 
technical innovation and advancement as an underlying inform of ideological power;  148 
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• Financial elites (property owners, local businesspersons, corporate directors, 149 
investors) can use monetary and fiscal resources as an underlying form of economic 150 
power;  151 
• Physical elites (soldiers, police officers, organized criminals) can use physical 152 
violence or force as a form of military power;  153 
• Regulatory elites (lawyers, national planners, political representatives, members of a 154 
political party) can use the legal system as a form of political power.  155 
This integrated framework supposes that the way that elites will likely exercise their power 156 
across low-carbon pathways will differ—based not only on context and country, but also their 157 
type (technical, financial, physical, and regulatory) and scale (local, national, transnational).   158 
The need to understand the role that elites, power relations and political economy play 159 
in energy transitions for climate change mitigation is now well-rehearsed (e.g. Meadowcroft 160 
2011, Kern & Markard, 2016), including in low and middle-income countries (Baptista & 161 
Plananska 2017) and in relation to renewable energy (Baker, L. 2015). Our study therefore 162 
chimes with broader analysis of the justice dimensions of “green” transitions, (Newell & 163 
Mulvaney 2013, Scoones et al 2015), as well as work which contains explicit discussion of 164 
elites (Sovacool et al 2017; Sovacool and Brisbois 2019).  165 
For the purposes of this study we identify three separate elite processes or responses: 166 
experimentation, financialisation, and dispossession.   We call these processes rather than 167 
merely consequences, impacts, or outcomes to imply that they often (though not always) 168 
embody intent, and the active, and often strategic, role that elites perform in climate 169 
responses.  Our elaboration of elite processes is significantly inspired by Paprocki (2018), 170 
who also identified two of the three pathways we examine (experimentation, dispossession) 171 
but only in Bangladesh. We draw from her arguments and build on these latter two concepts 172 
together with a third one, that of financialisation. Though like Paprocki (2018) we also 173 
explore these processes in Bangladesh, but extend such thinking across a broader array of 174 
low-carbon pathways with case examples (i.e. coastal protection, climate risk insurance and 175 
climate change mitigation) from other geographical settings  from Africa, Europe and North 176 
America.  177 
2.1 Experimentation  178 
Following Paprocki’s (2018) work, the elite process of “experimentation” envisions 179 
low-carbon pathways, often deployed in more social, economic, or geographically peripheral 180 
areas, as an arena where technical elites can pilot new, novel, or risky technologies. She gives 181 
multiple examples of climate smart homes, protective dykes, shrimp aquaculture, and even 182 
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drinking wells.  The “laboratory” for these experiments is essentially the world itself 183 
(sometimes specific countries or locations, other times the entire planet), a place where real 184 
life experiments are located and where particular methodologies to understanding risk are put 185 
into practice (Knorr-Cetina 1992; Voytenko et al. 2016). Experiments are a form of 186 
“anticipatory action” (Anderson 2010) that seek to use countries as a “development 187 
laboratory” (Cons 2018) or “living laboratory” (Tilley 2011).    188 
In particular, Paprocki (2018) frames experimentation as a North-South phenomenon, 189 
with technical elites—scientists, engineers, consultants, and researchers—in industrialized 190 
countries using Bangladesh as a low-income country, for the piloting or testing of new 191 
innovations and technologies. Such technical elites justify these processes of 192 
experimentation, especially those with problematic cultural and socioeconomic consequences, 193 
because they will lead to “new ideas and technologies” for fighting climate change (Paprocki 194 
2018: 6).   195 
Another feature of experimentation can be that of “epistemic supremacy” (Rodriguez 196 
2017) that privileges Western science, technology and knowledge and discounts objections 197 
and other ways of knowing. Edwards and Bulkeley (2018: 3) add that “experimentation 198 
entails an ambivalence to both the possibilities of the present and the potential of the future,” 199 
reshaping approaches to experimentation as well as the subjects of experiments to meet the 200 
needs of the experimenter. 201 
Smart technology and satellite imagery are increasingly playing a role in the 202 
construction of hegemonic narratives on climate change, serving as powerful signifiers of the 203 
Global North’s superior ability to examine global challenges from a ‘bird’s eye’ perspective. 204 
Moreover, as Potapov et al (2014) explore, it is countries such as the United States and Japan 205 
that effectively conduct surveillance of the Global South via remote sensing, frequently using 206 
forest surveys and assessments to monitor activities that could emit carbon in the South, such 207 
as tropical deforestation in Peru.   208 
Experimentation, of course, need not be limited to North-South exchanges.  There are 209 
numerous examples of where elites within Northern countries also use experiments to gain 210 
competitive advantage over each other. In the North, scientific elites have used experiments 211 
to  observe “action oriented research” on land use planning and “Green/Blue Cities” as well 212 
as “New Forms of Urban Governance,” “Experimental Cities,” and “Urban Experiments” 213 
(Voytenko et al. 2016; Edwards and Bulkeley 2018).  Even if such experiments or tests 214 
marginalize consumers, or produce externalities, they may still be seen as a success if they 215 
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benefit elite power via technology transfer, the development of intellectual property, or 216 
validation of a new prototype.   217 
We observe the hegemonic features of experimentation at play in numerous low-218 
carbon pathways. The international Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, which experimented 219 
with new crops and strands for biofuel, for example, underscores the hegemonic side of 220 
experimentation and it has been criticized for pushing industry interests over local 221 
stakeholder interests and for contributing to the degradation of carbon-intensive peat forests 222 
(Laurance et al. 2010; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Similar experiments with 223 
afforestation and hybrid crops throughout Africa have been attacked for worsening social, 224 
political, and gender inequality (Anderson et al. 2011; Prouty 2009; Sovacool et al. 2015).   225 
2.2 Financialisation  226 
Financialisation is an increasingly amorphous term across the social sciences 227 
concerned with critiques of contemporary capitalism and now subject to a growing diversity 228 
of empirical and theoretical interpretations. Taking its origins from Marxist heterodox 229 
economics (Bayliss et al 2018, Fine 2013) the term “financialisation” has latterly, though less 230 
commonly, emerged as a concept within economic geography (Pike and Pollard 2010) and 231 
development studies (Mawdsley 2018, Bracking 2012, 2016).  232 
The growing literature on financialisation is wide-ranging and often contested 233 
(Epstein 2005; Fine 2013; Leyshon and Thrift 2007; Jerneck 2017). At its most simple 234 
financialisation can be described as the expansion and proliferation of financial markets in 235 
general (Fine 2013: 56), in light of the increasing and integral role that finance has played in 236 
the global economy and in many national economies since 1970, particularly those with 237 
highly developed capital markets. A broad definition would thus be: the process through 238 
which financial interests, markets, or institutions expand in terms of size, value, or influence.  239 
More specifically, we use it here to refer to (a) the expansion of financial markets into 240 
previously public or non-market dimensions, (b) the growing financial activities of non-241 
financial firms as compared to their productive activities, and (c) the increasing share of GDP 242 
and national income from the financial sector which has seen the incorporation of national 243 
economies and firms into global circuits of financial capital as an indicator of economic 244 
maturity. 245 
 Although financialisation is celebrated by many as the “democratization of finance” – 246 
through which a range of new actors at multiple scales can access finance to fund 247 
entrepreneurial investment – there are two main negative implications of greater 248 
financialisation that are relevant to our analysis. Firstly, financialisation has been increasingly 249 
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associated with growing global inequality (e.g. Piketty 2015). Secondly, it may increase the 250 
exposure of newly incorporated economic actors and regions to the systemic risks inherent to 251 
financial markets, potentially creating new vulnerabilities (Mawdsley 2018).   252 
Until recently the literature on financialisation has tended to focus on advanced and 253 
liberal market-based economies, particularly the United States and United Kingdom. 254 
However, emerging markets or “frontier economies” offer increasing research opportunities 255 
for global capital flows (Mawdsley 2018:267). Moreover, given that “theorizing 256 
financialisation requires global perspectives” (Christophers 2012), any analysis must go 257 
beyond the scale of national boundaries in order to examine the ever-shifting dynamic 258 
international circuits and networks of debt, equity and ownership. There is therefore 259 
significant opportunity to examine its expansion into new global assets for speculation, such 260 
as renewable energy as a rapidly expanding infrastructural sector as we discuss in Section 5. 261 
The expansion of financialisation into development finance is a further focus of our 262 
analysis, particularly in Section 4 which explores climate risk insurance as a new 263 
financialised form of climate change adaptation.  As Mawdsley explores, in recent decades 264 
there has been “a distinctive acceleration and deepening of the financialisation-development 265 
nexus” (Mawdsely 2016:265) resulting in significant shifts in the models and types of 266 
development finance. These shifts have seen the evolution of an industry that previously 267 
provided the majority of assistance via loans and grants, to one that is now acting in 268 
partnership with institutions “which are themselves increasingly governed by financial 269 
logics”, such as venture capital, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and global accountancy 270 
firms (Ibid page 267). This “re-configuration of parts of the ‘developing world’ as the risky 271 
frontiers of profitable investment” (Mawdsley 2016:271), with financial institutions 272 
providing “the institutional and material basis for capital penetration, financialisation, market 273 
development and a more orderly set of practices for the management of risk to capital” 274 
(Carroll and Jarvis 2014:535). 275 
2.3 Dispossession  276 
Dispossession is associated with processes through which market elites effectively 277 
come to possess the assets of others, and is a central theme in political ecology research 278 
(Sovacool 2016; Paprocki 2018). “Dispossession” has its roots in Marxist- inspired political 279 
economy and theorizes that the capitalist system is constantly striving for profits and capital 280 
accumulation in a competitive market economy so that labor, land, and other assets become 281 
“dispossessed” and treated as commodity, subject to the same pricing mechanisms (Gilpin, 282 
1987: 36-38). In this sense dispossession is sometimes a consequence of financialisation and 283 
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experimentation. Drawing from these antecedents, Harvey (2004: 66) elaborates the concept 284 
of “accumulation by dispossession,” defined as the “centralization of wealth and power in the 285 
hands of a few by dispossessing the public of their wealth or land.”  Accumulation by 286 
dispossession can take a variety of forms, including the privatization of land and forcible 287 
relocation of people residing there, the establishment of property rights or suppression of 288 
rights to the commons, and the process of appropriating assets such as natural resources or 289 
land (Harvey 2003, 2006). Political dispossession has been defined as the (neoliberal) 290 
restructuring of the state by finance through the privatization of profits, and the socialization 291 
of losses (Keucheyan 2018:498).  292 
Dispossession, however, can also be intentional rather than merely consequential, and 293 
it can have many causal mechanisms. The most direct is simply stealing or “grabbing” of 294 
land.  When an area already owned or controlled by a group is taken over by others, it is 295 
known as land seizure (White et al. 2012). When a group is prevented from acquiring or 296 
accessing land to which it is entitled, it is known as land denial (Adnan 2013).  Ex situ 297 
displacement or dispossession is a process whereby people are directly and forcibly removed 298 
from their land; in situ displacement or dispossession is when struggles for or regulation of 299 
land indirectly leads to expulsion, such as through higher prices or changes in the law 300 
(Feldman and Geisler 2011).   301 
Bernstein (2010) has developed a typology of land dispossession. Sometimes, farmers 302 
or peasants are displaced by local elites that own property or agrarian capital; or, they are 303 
displaced by their neighbors who begin to accumulate wealth and differentiate themselves by 304 
class.  In other times, dispossession can be more a national and international phenomena, 305 
with pressures coming from political elites in urban areas or even transnational flows of 306 
capital.  Increasingly, dispossession has involved corporate actors investing in genetically 307 
engineered crops or the growing of feedstocks that end up displacing people from their land 308 
(McMichael 2012; Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011). In others cases, national or corporate “land 309 
deals” may legally set aside land for other uses such as economic development or the creation 310 
of jobs. Anguelovski et al. (2017) frame this as land grabbing via “selective land use 311 
regulations and resettlement.” Fairhead et al. (2012), conceptualize these processes as “green 312 
grabbing,” where physical or regulatory elites “grab” an area in order to protect and preserve 313 
it for conservation or other reasons.  314 
As well as land, elites can also dispossess people of their wealth or financial assets 315 
through processes enabled by markets, technology, and (lax) regulation. In his critique of 316 
neoliberalism and privatization, Harvey (2003) discusses how the privatization and 317 
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commodification of public assets has essentially transferred property from public ownership 318 
to private ownership, moving capital from national governments to private parties.  These 319 
elites can then (perversely) sell or rent back to the public what used to be theirs, using capital 320 
to earn more capital.  Examples of such instances include the dispossession of assets (the 321 
raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and 322 
stock manipulations (Harvey 2004: 74-75). The collapse of United States-based energy 323 
company Enron, for example, dispossessed many employees of their livelihoods and their 324 
pension rights. In other cases, Harvey (2004) documents how regulatory or financial elites 325 
suddenly raise interest rates to force poorer nations into bankruptcy.  In neo-Marxist terms, 326 
these are instances of the capitalist class gaining power at the expense of the labor class. 327 
 There are numerous examples of where climate change measures or efforts have 328 
perpetuated dispossession.  Solar energy parks developed by international companies in India 329 
have been prone to exclusion and land grabbing (Yenneti et al. 2016).  Biofuel cultivation for 330 
private firms has also been prone to grabbing land from local communities, farmer, or 331 
pastoralists across Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda 332 
(Temper 2018).  The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, an international forum, has been 333 
similarly accused of facilitating land grabbing—often converting land needed by rural 334 
pastoralists or subsistence farmers into assets for elites (Fortin and Richardson 2013).  In 335 
Australia, the construction of the Wonthaggi desalinization plant, an attempt to adapt to 336 
declining natural rainfall, resulted in the enclosure of thirteen sites of land of “significant 337 
value” to the Bunurong Aboriginal community (Barnett and O’Neil 2010). 338 
3. Case study selection, research methods and limitations  339 
 As our aim in the paper is to provide a multidimensional and interdisciplinary 340 
understanding of elite involvement in responses to climate change, we have selected cases 341 
that reflected a diversity of core elements.  We decided on three key criteria for case study 342 
selection:  343 
• Technological diversity or different types of carbon measures and pathways, including 344 
building resilience and capacity to climate change (coastal protection and adaptation), 345 
climate risk insurance (responding to major disasters or catastrophes), and mitigation 346 
(stopping greenhouse gas emissions); 347 
• Geographic and economic diversity to encompass low income, lower middle income 348 
and high income countries;  349 
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• Involvement of different elites and processes (at least two distinct types or more) with 350 
different resources and power dynamics as well as impacts on particular communities 351 
or stakeholders. 352 
As Table 1 shows—and as will be elaborated further below—Bangladesh and the 353 
Netherlands were our cases for adaptation, Malawi our case for climate risk insurance, and 354 
South Africa and Mexico our cases for mitigation.  These cases were chosen because they 355 
cover a diverse mix of technologies, market economies and national contexts, and types of 356 
elites. 357 
Table 1: Overview and selection criteria for our five case studies  358 
 359 
Case study  Technological type Level of 
development* 
Elite types 






Netherlands  Adaptation (coastal 
protection) 
High income Technical, financial, 
regulatory, physical 














regulatory, physical  
Source: Authors. “Type” of country taken from the 2018 World Bank classifications for 360 
“country and lending groups.” 361 
 362 
 To collect data for our five cases, we sought to conduct a comprehensive but timely 363 
literature review.  The selection of literature and information sources was done along the 364 
following three dimensions: 365 
• Technical, social, political, and economic dimensions of the five cases represented 366 
in peer-reviewed academic publications and journals, across all disciplines; 367 
• Public reports and papers released by the governmental bodies, industry, finance 368 
and civil society, which observe and investigate the current state of climate change 369 
and policy trends and drivers in each of the five countries; 370 
• Sector specific online and print media, including newspapers, magazines, and 371 
websites with very up to date articles in the climate field, often used when the 372 
academic peer-reviewed or governmental and civil society literature was sparse.  373 
All in all, we cite many of these works in the reference list of the study.  374 
 Notwithstanding our selection of cases and interdisciplinary literature review, our 375 
approach does have a number of limitations.  Our broad-based, multi-scalar definition of 376 
elites, while inclusive, does group technical elites (who tend to have elevated knowledge) 377 
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alongside physical elites (commanders of large militaries, captains of the police), regulatory 378 
elites (those making policies, standards, and regulations) and financial elites (those with 379 
control and influence over large flows of finance capital).  They all meet our definition of an 380 
elite, but express their elitism in qualitatively different ways that are only partially captured 381 
in the study. Secondly, is it not our contention that the three pathways—experimentation, 382 
financialisation, and dispossession—are the only ways elites respond to climate change. 383 
Bonds (2010) for instance identified another pathway of “elite mobilization” rooted on 384 
knowledge production, and Paprocki (2018), whom we build on, had another pathway of 385 
“imagination,” of connecting elite efforts to strong positive vision of the future or a variety of 386 
futures. So our three pathways are meant to be illustrative rather than fully representative or 387 
exhaustive.   388 
Furthermore, at moment while our analysis reveals how elites can coopt or capture 389 
climate change responses, the analysis does not fully reveal how elites are shaped by specific 390 
forms of capitalism within each context we look at. We are unable to show for example how 391 
the experimentation of climate change elites differs from experimentation that elites carry out 392 
in non-climate change policy arenas. Although our analysis reveals the people who are being 393 
affected, the elite actions themselves (both external and local actors) and some of the specific 394 
capitalist relations within each case (dependent on factors such as property rights, unions, 395 
political parties, economic dependency of states on external funding etc.), it does not 396 
necessarily show how this inequality and wealth concentration is distinct from other 397 
processes of uneven development that define capitalism.  Lastly, as a starting point for our 398 
analysis, the study focuses more on sets of actors as analytical categories, rather than 399 
privileging an analysis of capitalist relations and discreet power operating through markets 400 
and institutions, which we encourage others to do after our analysis, perhaps following some 401 
of the actors we identify. 402 
 Nonetheless, as we will see in the next three sections of the paper, the three processes 403 
of experimentation, financialisation, and dispossession operate across the five selected cases 404 
of coastal protection measures in Bangladesh and the Netherlands, climate risk insurance in 405 
Malawi, and climate change mitigation and renewable energy financing in Mexico and South 406 
Africa—despite their differing local contexts.  As we will see in our case studies, 407 
experimentation involves not only pilots, such as microfinance in Bangladesh, or new 408 
technologies, such as reversible seawalls in the Netherlands, but also forms of monitoring, 409 
simulation, policy experimentation, and feedback and learning that help advance elite 410 
interests.  In Malawi, experimentation occurs at the nexus of sophisticated computing and 411 
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insurance algorithms used by the financing community, and in South Africa and Mexico, it 412 
relates to policy experimentation with different types of auctions mechanisms and designs.  413 
Financialisation in Bangladesh relates to the integration and bundling of microfinance 414 
and household debt into global microfinance investment vehicles. In the Netherlands, it 415 
involves Dutch construction, engineering, dredging, and marine industry firms building 416 
equity through stocks, mergers and acquisitions, and venture capital.  Malawi, South Africa, 417 
and Mexico exhibit more definitive characteristics such as the use of financial instruments 418 
(e.g., risk insurance) or increasing incomes from the investment and financial sectors. 419 
 We will see dispossession related to the relocation of communities along the 420 
floodplains of Bangladesh as well as the exclusion of fishers and recreational users of 421 
watersheds from the Dutch coast, as well as considerable destruction of the environment.  In 422 
Malawi, it is vulnerable farmers and communities who bear the brunt of insurance premiums 423 
(insured as a last resort). In South Africa, community benefit funds have been mismanaged to 424 
the detriment of local groups, and in Mexico, social protests and opposition to renewable 425 
energy has been met with force and violence from the state.  426 
4. Coastal protection: The elite processes of afforestation, micro-finance and seawalls   427 
Coastal protection efforts deal primarily with attempts to mitigate the risks of severe 428 
weather along coastal areas, especially storm surges and damage from hurricanes and 429 
typhoons.  They can include “soft” measures using natural capital such as afforestation and 430 
mangrove restoration, or “hard” measures such as seawall construction or reinforcement 431 
(Sovacool 2011; Dolšak and Prakash 2018).  Annual weather-related disasters have increased 432 
fourfold in the past forty years, and insurance payouts have increased by a factor of eleven 433 
over the same period, rising by $10 billion per year for most of the past decade (Reddy and 434 
Assensa 2009). One team of researchers even found that due to climate change, average 435 
storm surge damage will likely rise from $10 to $40 billion per year in 2014 to possibly $100 436 
trillion by 2100, affecting up to 600 million people (Hinkel et al. 2014). Indeed, by 437 
combining future global sea level rise with tide gauge water levels, another research team 438 
expects that today’s “once in a century” storm surges might become “once in a decade” 439 
storms in the future (Tebaldi et al. 2012). We see elites and our processes at work across hard 440 
and soft coastal protection measures in both Bangladesh and the Netherlands.    441 
4.1 Bangladesh  442 
Given that Bangladesh is arguably one of the countries most at risk to climate change, 443 
experimentation is strongly present in Bangladesh as it constitutes an ideal laboratory for 444 
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technical elites to trial different coastal protection measures. As Paprocki (2018) and Cons 445 
(2018) have documented, Bangladesh, especially its southwestern borderlands where sea 446 
level rise, salt-water intrusion, and cyclones occur, has become a ground zero laboratory for 447 
so-called “resilient development.”  Experiments include training programs sponsored by the 448 
United Sates or European Union that seek to educate farmers on new ways of growing 449 
vegetables, planting trees, and erecting single-family rainwater collection wells, as well as 450 
schemes to build flood defenses, mounds, domes, and shelters. Capital intensive dykes, 451 
erected by the technical elites at the Bangladesh Water Development Board, have become a 452 
particularly popular measure (Sovacool 2018). These experiments, however, have often 453 
occurred without adequate or full community consent, and in some cases have even resulted 454 
in maladaptation, such as when Bangladeshi dykes have been flooded and thereby acted as 455 
buffers that prevent proper drainage rather than facilitated it (Sovacool 2018).   456 
We also see a link between other technical elites (such as experts in satellite imagery, 457 
remote sensing, and digital forest management) and climate change-informed 458 
experimentation in Bangladesh.  There, systems such as Landsat (Patapov et al. 2017), Linear 459 
Imaging Self Scanner (LISS), and Advanced Wide Field Sensor (AWiFS) satellite data 460 
(Reddy et al. 2016) are used to monitor and track the extent of deforestation linked to carbon 461 
emissions.  Scientific and technical institutes such as the Indian National Remote Sensing 462 
Centre, Bangladesh Forest Department, USAID, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and 463 
World Bank all conduct these types of remote assessments (Rahman et al. 2017), which have 464 
become integrated into Bangladesh’s Forestry Master Plan from 2017 to 2036 (Bangladesh 465 
Forest Department. 2016). These technical elites entrench “epistemic supremacy” by 466 
imposing a new (and supposedly superior) way of seeing and governing a policy problem to 467 
local agencies.  Physical elites, such as forest patrols or the police, then enforce policies 468 
relating to experiments, and detain those who encroach on protected areas (Rahman et al. 469 
2017; Sarker et al. 2011). 470 
 Efforts at experimentation have been coupled with financialisation, often beginning 471 
with the integration of local communities into global commodity markets and financing 472 
mechanisms.  For example, community-based adaptation measures supported by USAID and 473 
the World Bank have focused on community and social responsiveness by offering market-474 
based incentives to vulnerable communities who are interested in diversifying their economic 475 
activities into new forestry, fishing and farming sectors.  These programs include 476 
incorporating non-monetary farming practices into a “Triple F” model of “Forestry, Fisheries, 477 
and Food” that seeks to create local economies of exchange and trade and then connect them 478 
Elite power and low-carbon pathways 15 
 
to the commodity markets in Dhaka.  One aspect of the program even disbursed mobile 479 
phones so sellers could check global commodity prices. The central premise behind FFF 480 
activities is that adaptation efforts must also generate a continuous flow of income for local 481 
communities (Rawlani et al. 2011). The problem with such efforts is that they fold local 482 
communities into a market economy, often at the global scale, and then use financial tools—483 
often microfinancing loans—to keep them permanently trapped in debt (Cons and Paprocki 484 
2010). Communities then struggle to pay off the interest – let alone the principal – and 485 
borrow perpetually until some households lose their collateral.  Karim (2011) similarly warns 486 
that microfinance lending in Bangladesh leads to increasing levels of indebtedness among 487 
rural poor communities and frequently worsens economic, social, and even environmental 488 
vulnerabilities.  Banerjee and Jackson (2017) critique Bangladeshi microfinance for 489 
escalating levels of indebtedness as well, but also aggressive and predatory repayment efforts 490 
(such as shaming those who are late paying or showing up at funerals to collect). They warn 491 
such efforts can lead to an “inescapable debt spiral” where borrowers take out multiple loans 492 
from different microfinance banks to repay previous loans.  493 
Financialisation explicitly occurs when this microfinance debt behind FFF and other 494 
community investments for adaptation becomes packaged and resold into speculative assets 495 
and financial vehicles.  Bateman (2010) argues that Bangladeshi microfinance institutions are 496 
commercial entities primarily concerned with their financial self-sufficiency and profits, not 497 
necessarily poverty reduction. Consequently, under this “new wave” of lending, vendors 498 
become a for-profit industry with promising returns that are then invested in from 499 
international backers, many of them corporate, linking Bangladeshi microfinance with Wall 500 
Street (Bateman 2010). Whereas most microfinance lending used to be provided by 501 
development banks and donor organizations, this is no longer the case, as the sector has 502 
shifted to a more commercialized model that is linked to microfinance investment vehicles, or 503 
MIVs (Convergences 2018). These MIVs are open to multiple investors and since the late 504 
1990s, when they were created, they have grown in number to 127 with $13.5 billion in total 505 
assets under management globally.  MIVs remain “the primary gateway for private investors 506 
looking to invest in emerging and frontier markets mainly because of their expertise over the 507 
whole value chain” and are largely financed by pension funds, global banks such as BNP 508 
Paribas, foundations, retail investors and high-net-worth individuals (Convergences 2018).  509 
Indeed, as of 2016, only 20% of microfinance capital came from public investors. 510 
(Convergences 2018) 511 
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The financialisation of Bangladesh is connected to experimentation as well, as 512 
national and international financial elites frequently use digitization, computer technologies, 513 
and social monitoring to aggressively track local lenders (Karim 2011).). Another part is 514 
placing borrowers into groups of five members to make them jointly responsible for loans, 515 
meaning members of the group police each other and report any aberrant behavior to the 516 
financial institutions that could lead to a default, including sickness or alcoholism. 517 
Microfinance lending thus leads to an increase in moneylending and further expansion of the 518 
microfinance industry.  519 
Bangladesh has lastly been prone to strong forms of dispossession, in particular 520 
numerous types of land grabbing associated with the development of seawalls and 521 
embankments.  Sovacool (2018) documents the direct displacement of vulnerable 522 
communities alongside roads or dykes intended to protect urban areas.  In some gases, gangs 523 
of bandits employed by criminal bosses or local strongmen yielding bamboo clubs use threats 524 
of violence, or violence itself, to appropriate land. Seawalls and dykes intended to help 525 
predominately poor populations have instead, at times, been plagued by land predation and 526 
land grabbing, with khas (public) and (coastal island) lands most at risk (Islam 2006a; Rashid 527 
2014; Paul and Islam 2015). The most active agencies in these practices have been 528 
government departments and military forces as well as private interest groups inclusive of 529 
commercial land dealers and speculators, and civil officials in their personal capacities 530 
(Feldman and Geisler 2012).   Anguelovski et al. (2017) have similarly noted how the 531 
government-sponsored Greater Dhaka Integrated Flood Protection Project, intended to reduce 532 
flooding in the city, disproportionately burdened the urban poor. The siting of embankments, 533 
designed with little consultation of residents, has caused major disruptions to adjacent 534 
communities and their livelihoods. Initial designs have also excluded substantial areas of 535 
low-income settlement and caused widespread waterlogging inside the protected zone.  We 536 
thus see three of Bernstein’s (2010) types of dispossession—farmers and peasants, 537 
indigenous classes, and emergent capitalists—operating.  538 
4.2 The Netherlands  539 
These elite processes are not limited to only developing countries such as Bangladesh.  540 
In the Netherlands, technical elites have been strongly experimenting with coastal protection 541 
measures for more than a millennium, with the more recent Dutch Delta Works an illustrative 542 
example of coordinated efforts to build tidal barriers, locks, flood barriers and storm surge 543 
barriers. The Delta Works, from the 1950s to the 1980s, were supported on the grounds that 544 
they would protect against a 1 in 10,000 years storm surge event for the provinces of Holland, 545 
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and 1 in 4,000 years storm surge event for the provinces of Zeeland, Friesland, and 546 
Groningen (McRobie et al. 2015).  Their design, construction, and maintenance involved 547 
extensive scientific experimentation and advances in physics, biology, ecology, materials, 548 
and modelling (to name a few) (d’Angremond & Kooman 1986; Leemans 1986).  The elites 549 
behind these experiments included the government department Rijkswaterstaat (translated as 550 
the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management), scientists at the Delft 551 
Hydraulics Laboratory, and a consortium of major engineering firms such as Ballast Nedam, 552 
Boskalis Westminster, Baggermaatschappij Breejenhout, Hollandse Aanneming 553 
Maatschappij, Hollandse Beton Maatschappij, Van Oord-Utrecht, Stevin Baggeren, Stevin 554 
Beton en Waterbouw, Adriaan Volker Baggermaatschappij, Adriaan Volker Beton en 555 
Waterbouw and Aannemerscombinatie Zinkwerken (Sovacool and Linner 2015). The 556 
Rijkswaterstaat in particular considered themselves the “dike masters” of the world, and were 557 
modeled on the elite Corps des Ponts et Chaussees (Corps of Bridges, Waters, and Forests) in 558 
France (Sovacool and Linner 2015).  559 
Collectively, these government, scientific, and corporate actors ran hundreds of 560 
experiments and simulations to assess the integrity and performance of building materials 561 
such as natural rock, sand, and clay.  As a result of the new knowledge gleaned from these 562 
experiments, a number of new construction methods for pylons and vessels were designed, 563 
new dredging techniques were invented, ballasted bases and block mattresses perfected, and 564 
artificial islands were created (Sovacool and Linner 2015). One of the largest pieces of the 565 
Delta Works, the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier, was even designed to open and close; 566 
and to protect the parts of the storm surge barrier exposed to seawater, unique polypropylene 567 
and concrete-block mats, asphalt slabs and graded-filter mattresses had to be invented and 568 
installed (van Noortwijk and Klatter 1999).   More recently, in the digital era, the Delta 569 
Works have facilitated numerous ways to experiment with what the Government of 570 
Netherlands (2016: 2) calls “high tech flood protection.” One is the novel use of radar images 571 
from earth observation satellites to enhance the monitoring of dykes via remote sensing 572 
imagery and digital sensors.  Another is the use of “intelligent geotextiles” to provide early 573 
warning of deformations in floodwall structures, embankments, and dykes (Government of 574 
Netherland 2016).  The culmination of these experiments is proprietary (and likely valuable) 575 
data that give Dutch actors a competitive advantage when they seek to monetize their 576 
expertise.  577 
As such, moving from experimentation to financialisation, the perceived success of 578 
the Delta Works did not rest solely on its functional ability to provide flood control and 579 
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enhance safety; there was also a connection to profit making from infrastructure and global 580 
markets.  Initially, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Delta Works were funded almost entirely by 581 
public money (a “Delta Fund” to guarantee long term financial stability, raising about €1 582 
billion per year) (Kompier 2012).  Yet after the 1990s, particularly after the completion of the 583 
Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier, technical and financial elites at large Dutch engineering 584 
firms were able to utilize the threats from climate change and rising sea levels around the 585 
world—because of their links to government—to generate significant revenues and earnings 586 
from designing surge barriers based on its design around the world (Corvers 2009).  The 587 
knowledge from the Delta Works was financially appropriated in the 2000s, mostly by 588 
private engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) companies, in at least five large-589 
scale storm surge barriers totaling almost $11 billion of collective investment in the 590 
Netherlands as well as in Germany, Italy, the UK and the US, all done with expensive Dutch 591 
consultants (Hillen et al. 2010). One textbook suggested that more money can be made, given 592 
that innovations such as the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier are a necessary component 593 
of “next generation infrastructure” to be considered by every city as postindustrial society 594 
confronts climate change (Brown 2014).  According to this logic, the Delta Works becomes 595 
its own brand; and coastal protection is not done for social obligation, but for profit, 596 
becoming a magnet for finance.   597 
The financialisation of storm surge protection not only accrues wealth to these 598 
modern-day financial elites investing in EPC firms and consultants, it also seeks to replicate 599 
the Dutch experience in international markets.  Dutch seawalls have thus become intertwined 600 
with shareholder value, corporate ownership, and the separation of productive activities 601 
(dredging, building dams) from accumulative activities (building equity, growing pensions, 602 
making connections with venture capital). Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V., a Dutch 603 
dredging and marine heavy-lifting company involved in the Delta Works, began to earn more 604 
from shares, stocks and dividends than on direct profits from construction in the 2000s 605 
(Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. 2010; 2017).  Royal Van Oord, another Dutch maritime 606 
company involved in the Delta Works which specializes in land reclamation and artificial 607 
islands, also receives almost as much value from its equity and stocks as it does its 608 
construction business in dredging and offshore wind energy, its two leading markets (Van 609 
Ord 2019). Royal VolkerWessels Stevin N.V., a major Dutch construction business involved 610 
in the Delta Works, expanded into venture capital markets over the past decade to supplement 611 
its construction efforts, and it returned to the stock market in 2017 (Volkerwessels, 2018). 612 
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 Lastly, the Dutch Delta Works perpetuated strong forms of dispossession across three 613 
dimensions: exclusionary forms of bidding and firm involvement; exclusionary forms of 614 
planning; and the physical dispossession of fishers and other recreational users of the 615 
watershed.  Firstly, due to the size and capital intensity of the project, the Rijkswaterstaat 616 
presumed that contracting private construction companies, especially small and medium 617 
enterprises, would not work (Bijker 1993; Bijker 2002). Thus, only a select number of 618 
construction companies were invited to participate, with the final consortium consisting of a 619 
mere eleven entities.  Secondly, the decision-making and planning process was exclusionary 620 
and limited to the financial, regulatory, and technical elite. Though the Rijkswaterstaat 621 
featured well trained civil engineers, the project tended to ignore contrary viewpoints coming 622 
from ecologists and biologists; creating a “highly closed system” with a “monopoly on 623 
knowledge” (Leemans 1986).  Thus, for decades the views of oppositional saltwater fishers, 624 
environmentalists and conservation scientists, civil society members, and even local planners 625 
were marginalised (Sovacool and Linner 2015).  Finally, the Delta Works as a whole 626 
displaced fishers and local recreational users of waterways, and it led to severely degraded 627 
fishing areas, eroded biodiversity and ecosystem vitality, and led to a massive die-off of non-628 
human species. As Eelkema (2013: ix) declared when reviewing the environmental impacts 629 
of the project: “it has become clear that the Eastern Scheldt is a basin that has been shaped 630 
strongly by a multitude of human interventions… It will take in the order of centuries before 631 
the morphological effects of these interventions will have leveled out.” 632 
5. Disaster recovery and climate risk insurance  633 
While there is little consolidated evidence to date on emerging processes of climate 634 
risk insurance (Weingärtner 2017), as we now discuss, such processes offer examples of 635 
experimentation, financialisation and dispossession, at the same time as potential significant 636 
benefits for climate change adaptation finance.  637 
Climate risk insurance is taken out by – or on behalf of – regions or countries against 638 
natural disasters and extreme weather events such as droughts, hurricanes and floods, as a 639 
mechanism for climate change adaptation. The insurance is index-based or parametric, 640 
meaning that payouts are triggered when certain parameters fall within certain values as 641 
opposed to being based on assessments of actual loss (Reeves 2016). A key rationale put 642 
forward for climate risk insurance is that it offers a more efficient and rapid response to 643 
natural disasters than the current humanitarian system is able to.  644 
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Sovereign climate risk insurance is based on a similar model to that of catastrophe 645 
bonds, a relatively recent innovation which began in 2000 and which has grown rapidly since 646 
the 2008 financial crisis (Ralph 2017), partly in response to the rise in weather disasters such 647 
as hurricanes Matthew (Haiti and Florida) in 2016, and Irma (Florida) and Maria (Dominica 648 
and Puerto Rico) in 2017 (Gray et al 2018). Considered an “innovative risk transfer product” 649 
by the insurance industry (Insurance Information Institute 2018), catastrophe bonds are used 650 
by insurers as an alternative to conventional insurance and reinsurance products as they allow 651 
insurers to pass the risk of natural disasters onto investors in the global capital markets (WSJ 652 
2016). The bonds pay out subject to a variety of triggers that have in turn been determined by 653 
a variety of complex metrics including wind speeds and storm surges and cover a specified 654 
period, usually between one and three years (WSJ 2016).  As with any bond, a catastrophe 655 
bond is a type of debt security and therefore a tradable financial asset (Phillips 2014).  656 
Catastrophe bonds are one of the fastest growing parts of the global insurance market 657 
and the most visible form of insurance linked security (ILS), now increasingly popular with 658 
pension funds, hedge funds, big investors and sovereign wealth funds.  While there are 659 
several ILS fund managers and investors based in the City of London, until very recently 660 
there was no legal regime in the UK under which catastrophe bonds could be issued. For this 661 
reason, most have been issued in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and Dublin, in turn raising 662 
questions of transparency and accountability (Ralph and Binham 2017). Risk analysis is 663 
undertaken by independent firms such as Applied Insurance Research and Eqecat who 664 
undertake climatic modelling.   665 
Various justifications are given for the promotion of climate risk insurance as a tool 666 
for climate change adaptation. These include firstly the inadequate, fragmented and 667 
unreliable nature of the dispersal of humanitarian assistance, including mismatches between 668 
the way it is provided and how it should be used, the tardiness of international aid appeals 669 
and the failure of patterns of disbursement to meet patterns of need (Talbot and Barder 2016). 670 
As a result, survivors of humanitarian disasters lose their livelihoods, resorting for instance to 671 
the sale of livestock and tools, and taking their children out of school. This is compounded by 672 
the reallocation of public resources by governments away from essential services such as 673 
health and education in order to respond to the crisis. A second justification is the inability of 674 
many states to fulfil their traditional function as insurer of last resort, particularly in the case 675 
of fiscal instability (Ibid).   676 
For many development finance institutions such as the UK’s Department for 677 
International Development (DfID) and the World Bank, as well as the IPCC, the United 678 
Elite power and low-carbon pathways 21 
 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (World Bank 2018) and a collaboration of 679 
insurers called the Insurance Development Forum (IDF), climate risk insurance is viewed as 680 
something of a panacea to disaster response. In addition, the InsuResilience Global 681 
Partnership for Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance Solutions, launched in 2017 682 
with the collaboration of the G20, the V20 (a group of 20 of the world’s most vulnerable 683 
countries) civil society organizations, the private sector and academia, aims to bring climate 684 
insurance to 400 million people in the developing world by 2020 (Llull 2016). In this sense, 685 
insurance contracts are seen as a technical solution that can override the collective action 686 
problems of the geopolitics of donors and development finance. This is accompanied by an 687 
unwavering belief that the tools of the financial industry, together with the power of global 688 
capital markets can be channeled for the benefit of the global public good.  689 
However thus far, catastrophe bonds have been a mechanism largely deployed in 690 
wealthy countries, particularly the United States (Insurance Information Institute 2018). It is 691 
only recently that the catastrophe bond model has been applied to expand to low and middle-692 
income countries, including through the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, set 693 
up in 2014 by the World Bank (Allianz 2016:12); the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance 694 
Facility; and the African Risk Capacity (ARC).  695 
5.1 Malawi  696 
Malawi’s climate risk insurance can be seen as a moderately strong example of 697 
experimentation, in that it brings together the latest and highly sophisticated innovations in 698 
climate and catastrophe modelling and financial risk analysis, thereby merging what 699 
Keucheyan (2018:496) refers to as “big data, insurance and nature.”  Malawi’s insurance was 700 
a part of the African Risk Capacity (ARC) which was established in early 2012 by the 701 
African Union to pool risk across the continent (OPM 2017).  ARC is owned by its member 702 
states and capital contributors: at its inception Germany’s state-owned development bank 703 
KfW and the UK’s DfID provided “repayable capital” of €50 million and £90 million 704 
commitments respectively to be repaid after 20 years with no interest (ARC 2018). Since 705 
October 2016, ARC has signed MoUs with 17 countries (ARC 2017). ARC uses its own 706 
dedicated risk-modelling software, Africa Risk View (ARV) which is currently focused on 707 
drought. This software is proprietary and therefore not accessible to the public but concerns 708 
have still been raised over the reliability, complexity and accuracy of this model have been 709 
raised (Reeves 2017, OPM 2017:v).  710 
However, the ability to experiment and monitor risks has only occurred to the 711 
detriment of Malawi itself. The ARC and ARV failed to function effectively however during 712 
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a severe drought in Malawi in May 2016 which affected 6.7 million people (OPM 2017b:vi). 713 
In this case, despite Malawi having purchased a $5 million premium for 2015/6 agricultural 714 
season, the ARC’s model did not initially yield a pay-out, as a result of discrepancies 715 
between the outputs of the ARV model and the reality of the situation in-country. This led to 716 
a national and international outcry and subsequently a technical investigation (OPM 2017b). 717 
The main reason put forward by ARC for the failure of the ARV model was due to the 718 
modelling using a different maize variety with a longer maturation period than that which 719 
was actually used by farmers. It was also argued that the modelers failed to incorporate inputs 720 
from agronomists, agro-meteorologists and other experts and were simply “too far removed 721 
‘from the ground’” (OPM 2017b:34). By November 2016 ARC agreed to pay Malawi $8 722 
million, a fraction of the total estimated drought response cost of $395 million (Reeves 723 
2017:3). Moreover, the payment did not arrive until January 2017, long after funding was 724 
urgently needed to respond to the country’s humanitarian crisis. Subsequently Malawi did not 725 
renew its policy. 726 
Reeves (2017:3) even aptly describes ARC as “an experiment that failed Malawi” 727 
because of its inadequate and flawed design. The case has also raised significant questions as 728 
to whether this model can be effectively customized for individual country contexts (OPM 729 
2017b) and increased concerns over the accuracy, transparency and reliability of the ARV 730 
model. This, in addition to the fact that the ability to understand and operate it rests with a 731 
small number of individuals (OPM 2017b:14).  732 
In addition to the experimentation, Malawi offers a compelling example of how 733 
climate risk insurance is tied into the elite processes of financialisation, where it converts 734 
disaster recovery into a speculative asset. Such climate risk insurance has been described by 735 
Johnson (2014:157) as “securitization of the geophysical effects of climate change”, 736 
particularly through insurance-linked securities and in this sense, has facilitated the creation 737 
of “socioecological fixes” for capital through the “reconfiguration of hazard risk into asset 738 
class” (Ibid).  In setting up an ILS, an insurance firm creates a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 739 
on behalf of a government or public agency in order to sell the bonds to investors and hold 740 
the risk. Investors pay into the SPV that pays out to insurers should certain predefined events 741 
take place. Therefore, in the event that the natural hazard specified in the bond contract takes 742 
place and an insurer’s losses pile up, the investors risk losing their principal. But otherwise, 743 
investors benefit from a relatively lucrative revenue stream in the form of insurance 744 
premiums from the bonds (Talbot and Barder 2018:20). Despite having extremely poor credit 745 
ratings, ILSs were considered an attractive prospect for investors (and Malawi) as they offer 746 
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relatively high annual returns of between 5 to 15 per cent, as compared to corporate or 747 
government bonds (FT 2017).  748 
Lastly, Malawi’s climate risk insurance arguably constitutes dispossession in that it 749 
compounds inequality and dispossesses households or farmers of their capital (Duus-750 
Otterström and Jagers 2011). Indeed, contrary to the “polluter-pays principle,” such schemes 751 
require the most vulnerable countries who have least contributed to climate change “to co-752 
finance the costs that others have unilaterally imposed on them, whereas it would seem that 753 
they ought to have no part of that cost” (Ibid).  They effectively shift risk from the emitters of 754 
carbon dioxide to poor Malawi farmers at the frontlines of climate change (Reeves 2017 and 755 
Ralph and Aglionby 2017). As Malawi illustrates, despite having taken out a private plan it is 756 
still the government who ends up being the insurer of last resort (Johnson 2015, Isakson 757 
2015).  758 
6. Climate change mitigation: renewable energy auctions  759 
This final section examines the elite-driven processes that characterize the 760 
implementation of renewable energy auctions, drawing on examples from South Africa and 761 
Mexico. While renewable energy auctions have become something of a success story across 762 
the globe for the investment and projects they have helped to facilitate (Eberhard 2018) such 763 
investment has also led to the financialisation of renewable energy.  Renewable energy 764 
auctions have become the preferred mechanism for the procurement of utility-scale 765 
renewable energy under which independent power producers (IPPs) typically submit a bid 766 
with a price per unit of electricity at which they would sell electricity to the grid. Between 767 
2005 and 2016 the number of countries implementing renewable energy auctions grew from 768 
six to 67 (IRENA 2016), including various upper middle-income countries worldwide such as 769 
Mexico and South Africa. In Mexico, such competition has also raised concerns over both the 770 
long-term sustainability of renewable energy (Radowitz 2017) and the extent to which local 771 
communities have been able to participate and benefit (REN 21 2017). As we will see in 772 
South Africa and Mexico, the fierce and growing competition generated by renewable energy 773 
auctions has contributed to a significant and unanticipated reduction in the electricity tariffs 774 
submitted by project bidders and a rapidly evolving wind and solar PV market dominated by 775 
fewer and bigger players and highly globalized production chains.   776 
The growing success of the deployment of renewable energy has nonetheless been 777 
determined by the frameworks and logics of finance and investment, including its increasing 778 
financialisation via processes of securitization, on-selling and the creation of a secondary 779 
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market (Baker, L. 2015). Finance has played an integral role in shaping the way in which 780 
renewable energy infrastructures, technologies and their ownership are emerging. In this 781 
sense, renewable energy is situated in the context of its inseparable, mutually co-constitutive 782 
relationship with the finance that shapes and supports it and therefore becomes “a particular 783 
historical phenomenon inextricably tied up with unequal exchange” (Lohmann and Hildyard 784 
2014:10).  785 
6.1 South Africa  786 
We do see a link between renewable energy auctions in South Africa and our core 787 
concept of experimentation. There, technical, financial, and regulatory elites—a coalition of 788 
national and global renewable energy industries, government departments, and international 789 
investors—negotiated reforms to enable competitive procurement under a renewable energy 790 
auction program (Rennkamp et al. 2017). Although it was highly contested (Baker et al 791 
2014), the auction program marked the first time that electricity was procured from IPPs and 792 
from renewable energy.  The involvement of IPPs provoked Bayer et al. (2018: 306) to 793 
describe the program as an important “regulatory novelty,”.  Under South Africa’s renewable 794 
energy auction program, in order for the bid to be successful project companies are required 795 
to submit a competitive bid below a certain tariff cap and also to commit to socio-economic 796 
criteria. These socio-economic criteria include that developers procure a certain percentage of 797 
locally sourced and manufactured components (Rennkamp et al. 2017) and that local 798 
communities hold a minimum ownership shareholding of 2.5 % of the project. This 799 
shareholding has to be allocated to a legally established community trust, which is tasked 800 
with representing the local community and managing the dividend which will eventually 801 
accrue to the community after the project has paid off its debt by about year 15 of project 802 
operation (Baker L. and Wlokas 2015). These unique attributes of the South African auction 803 
program were heralded by some as a model for other countries to learn from and replicate. 804 
Eberhard and Kåberger (2016: 190) write that because South Africa occupies “a central 805 
position in the global debate regarding the most effective policy instruments to accelerate and 806 
sustain private investment in renewable energy,” it offers “important lessons” for many other 807 
emerging global markets. We interpret this to potentially mean places where critical 808 
infrastructure investments are sought by the financial elite.  809 
However, some of the lessons learned from the South African experiment may not be 810 
positive (Baker and Sovacool 2017).  For example, in some of the approved projects 811 
approved, community trusts have been established by project developers without 812 
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participation by the actual community. Not only do community trusts lack capacity, but 813 
conflicts have also ensued within the trusts over how the anticipated revenue streams should 814 
be spent and distributed (Wlokas et al 2017). Poorly designed local content legislation led to 815 
gaming of the system including through transfer pricing, which has counter intuitively 816 
resulted in higher project costs without meaningful local value added (Matsuo and Schmidt 817 
(2019: 24). 818 
Moving to financialisation, commercial priorities for “bankability” and the reduction 819 
of investor risk in South Africa as well as elsewhere are highly deterministic over the nature 820 
of a project’s development and its contractual arrangements (Eberhard and Kåberger 2016, 821 
Baker 2015).  The extent that the competitive nature of the auction program put downward 822 
pressure on renewable energy prices was also confirmed in the first segments of the program, 823 
with the first three bidding rounds all seeing falling prices motivated by increased 824 
competition (Eberhard and Kåberger 2016: 193)—this also occurred in Mexico. in South 825 
Africa, involving the community within structures of project ownership is often perceived as 826 
an investment risk (Baker L, 2015). There are therefore serious tensions between the 827 
increasingly complex financial and investment arrangements for renewable energy projects, 828 
and any socioeconomic co-benefits that may be required under national frameworks for 829 
renewable energy procurement.  830 
With this in mind, the way in which communities have been included in and affected 831 
by utility-scale renewable energy development has not always resulted in positive socio-832 
economic outcomes (Baker, L. 2015) and in this sense has arguably resulted in processes of 833 
dispossession in some cases. Despite its potential for socio-economic development, 834 
renewable energy development in South Africa is being implemented within a national 835 
context of inequality along racial divisions. This is as a result of the country’s apartheid 836 
legacy, despite attempts at land restitution and legislation for the economic empowerment of 837 
historically marginalized individuals, known as black economic empowerment. Many of the 838 
country’s renewable energy projects are located in rural areas with high levels of poverty and 839 
unemployment which has resulted in the mismanagement of community benefit funds and 840 
has put pressure on the limited planning capacity of municipal and provincial governments 841 
(Wlokas 2015).  Indeed, early evidence suggests that despite their pro-environmental 842 
outcomes, many auction programs and the projects that they facilitate have resulted in 843 
exclusionary and/or exploitative outcomes for those living in the national and local vicinity of 844 
these developments.  845 
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6.2 Mexico  846 
Experimentation plays a prominent role in the Mexican procurement program for 847 
renewables as well. This may be partly explained by the strong role regulatory elites play 848 
generally in the policy sphere, with domestic renewable energy policies in Mexico often 849 
determined and coordinated by the federal government in a top-down fashion (Pischke et al. 850 
2019).  Regulatory elites nonetheless sought to test or experiment with a number of distinct 851 
designs within the auction program. del Río (2017) notes that first and foremost policy was 852 
designed to explicitly minimize electricity transmission congestion and to adjust bid packages 853 
to incentivize “good” locations (to benefit the efficiency of the transmission or distribution 854 
network) and offer fewer rewards for “bad” locations (where prices were low).  They 855 
determined the location for these systems using complex long-term system simulations of the 856 
Mexican grid.   Secondly, del Río (2017) adds that the Mexican auction program has a unique 857 
“bonus system” where electricity from variable renewable resources is paid at a price that 858 
adjusts tariffs by “hourly adjustment factors,” to better reflect real time prices and times of 859 
higher and lower demand. Matsuo and Schmidt (2019) note a final experimental feature of 860 
the auction program in Mexico, that it is continuously calibrated to maximize commercial 861 
participation and to increase the attractiveness for foreign investors. For instance, the 862 
regulatory elite behind the Mexican program relaxed requirements regarding bid qualification 863 
and commercial operation dates in order to allow early-stage projects to bid into the auction, 864 
and they permitted the indexing of 15-year power purchasing agreements to Mexican pesos 865 
or United States dollars.  All three of these experimental features—locational nodal pricing, 866 
the bonus system, and commercial calibration—were intended to maximize investment 867 
returns and also improve the efficiency of the grid, although in reality they have often led to 868 
incomplete projects and high incompletion rates.   869 
  Moving to financialisation, Matsuo and Schmidt (2019) emphasize a starting point -  870 
the central financial goals inherent in the Mexican programme - by noting the entire bid 871 
evaluation scheme is intended to optimize “economic surplus” and “minimize bid costs” so as 872 
to attract financial flows. The Mexican program therefore has a number of determined 873 
attributes to maximize revenues and financial attractiveness.  The auctions are technology 874 
neutral with cost as the most important determinant (rather than a diversity of options), this is 875 
why it unusually includes nuclear power and natural gas as eligible under the program. It also 876 
has Clean Energy Certificates, which can be traded, and long-term contracts granted in 20-877 
year cycles (Matsuo and Schmidt 2019).  These elements have resulted in the benefits from 878 
the auction program accruing not only to Mexican debt providers and commercial banks, but 879 
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largely to international technical elites including foreign developers such as Enel (Italy), 880 
Engie (France and United Kingdom) or EDF (France), who have all invested heavily in the 881 
Mexican market (Matsuo and Schmidt 2019). The same is true of South Africa.  Rennkamp et 882 
al. (2017) also frame the Mexican renewable policy regime as one in which technical, 883 
regulatory and financial elites, i.e. international renewable energy equipment providers, 884 
government bureaucracies, and domestic renewable energy industry associations, have played 885 
an important influencing role. The same is true of South Africa 886 
Dispossession dynamics in renewable energy auctions have been similarly observed 887 
in Mexico, where 70 % of indigenous peoples are poor and 40 % of indigenous language 888 
speakers live in extreme poverty (CONEVAL 2016). Large-scale renewable energy 889 
generation projects are being built disproportionately in indigenous areas, notably Oaxaca, 890 
Yucatán and Puebla, where the most competitive renewable energy resources are located.  891 
Consequently, indigenous communities have endured significant negative impacts, including 892 
being drawn into conflicts over land tenure and corruption; while the extent of the benefits 893 
that they enjoy has so far been limited (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre et al. 894 
2017).  In some cases, resistance has resulted in community blockades, extensive protests, 895 
and protracted litigation (Baker, S. 2012). State police have even been called in repeatedly to 896 
quash protests and try to quell dissent—with 12 injured during one violent clash, and the 897 
governor of Oaxaca promising that “blood would flow” if a wind project was cancelled due 898 
to community opposition (Jung 2017: 14). Zárate-Toledo et al. (2019: 1) also note that on the 899 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, wind energy development has proceeded with “no consideration of 900 
local cultures or organizations, or the potential for joint ventures with local stakeholders that 901 
would treat rural indigenous populations as assets in the national energy transition.”   902 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications  903 
 The preceding examination of elite processes across our five case studies leads us to 904 
make six conclusions.  First, elite processes are occurring within the climate change pathways 905 
of coastal protection, climate risk insurance, and renewable energy auctions. As Table 2 906 
indicates, their presence is not uniformly strong across these cases, but most processes are 907 
present most of the time.  908 
Table 2: Degrees of Experimentation, Financialisation, and Dispossession in Climate 909 
Change Pathways 910 
Climate 
pathway  
Case study Experimentation Financialisation  Dispossession  




Bangladesh Strong  Moderate  Strong  
 Netherlands  Strong  Weak  Strong  
Climate risk 
insurance  




Mexico Moderate Moderate Moderate  
 South Africa  Moderate Strong Moderate  
Source: Authors 911 
Second, the types of elites at work are dynamic, falling into the technical, financial, 912 
regulatory, and physical categories described in the paper.  Table 3 offers a summary of these 913 
different types of elites with examples from each case study, with most elites operating in 914 
most cases (with some exceptions, notably the lack of physical elites in Malawi since refusal 915 
to disburse insurance claims does not require direct violence, or South Africa using 916 
community trusts). This evidence underscores the sheer diversity of different elites involved 917 
in, or shaping, each low-carbon pathway and case study. Future work—which we could not 918 
conduct here due to lack of space—ought to consider how these different elites interact,  919 
enable, reinforce, and/or simply assemble opportunity in the context of climate related 920 
development. Elite interaction across these types certainly deserves to be explored in greater 921 
detail.  922 
Table 3: Summary of elite processes of power and types of elites 923 
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 925 
 Third, elite responses involve not just different elite types, but also compelling 926 
interactions within and between pathways and responses.  We have treated them as 927 
analytically distinct here, but there are cases where experimentation, financialisation, and 928 
dispossession reinforce each other. For example, the experimentation currently embodied in 929 
the South African and Mexican renewable energy auction programs results in data, and 930 
insights, that can (and likely are) used by financial elites looking to further processes of 931 
financialisation.  The financialisation inherent in Malawi climate risk and disaster insurance 932 
focuses on least-cost strategies of diffusing risk that intertwine with processes of 933 
dispossession, with shifting risk from financial institutions into farmers and communities 934 
themselves, who must bear potential losses.  The dispossession present in both the 935 
Bangladeshi and Dutch coastal protection regimes makes it easier for elites to both conduct 936 
experiments (as elites achieve greater control over resources including land) and reap the 937 
benefits of financialisation (as they can then convert unproductive or non-productive assets 938 
into financial rewards).  The contours of Bangladeshi microfinance are also explicitly 939 
connected to forms of experimentation with big data and computerization, and novel yet 940 
invasive ways of socially monitoring borrowers.  941 
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 Fourth, elite power is a multi-scalar process. Our cases reveal locally embedded elites 942 
operating alongside national elites and even globally circulating, transnational elites. In 943 
Bangladesh, for instance, national policies have reoriented efforts towards boosting resilience 944 
and enhancing exports and economic development, practices that protect some—notably 945 
wealthy land owners—but exclude others—notably the landless and displaced peasants. At 946 
the level of cities and communities, we see bandits roaming the countryside on behalf of 947 
elites in order to stealing land or appropriating resources for development or coastal 948 
development projects.  Similarly, in the Netherlands, the local processes facilitating the Delta 949 
Works, especially the consolidation of expertise and power within the Rijkswaterstaat, 950 
enabled a power elite to emerge which utilized its monopoly on information to exclude and 951 
marginalize opponents, and ultimately collapse multiple ecosystems across the Dutch coast.  952 
In the case of climate risk insurance in Malawi, investors and fund managers who are 953 
disconnected from realities on the ground monitor financial flows while sophisticated risk 954 
modelling determines disbursement. Utility-scale renewable energy projects, in Mexico and 955 
South Africa meanwhile become conduits for global flows of finance and investment.  956 
Critically, while responses to climate change are in theory state-based, this research 957 
demonstrates the influence of forces and processes that go far beyond the jurisdiction of the 958 
nation state.  959 
Our study thus shows that there are direct linkages between elites and climate policy. 960 
Therefore, we ought to consider how policies addressing climate change are designed, and 961 
who is involved in such policy making processes. Kern and Rogge (2018), for example, argue 962 
that the long-term nature of transitions requires a more explicit focus on the policy making 963 
process, and more importantly, on its outcomes. If national climate policy, for example, is 964 
designed at the state level, but then enacted on by transnational elites that may cause harm at 965 
local level, this causes questions over the transparency of the policy process itself. We 966 
therefore need to pay attention and unveil who the potentially invisible elites are that may 967 
have influence on, and benefit unfairly from, climate policy processes. 968 
Fifth, our analysis reveals why some low-carbon pathways or transitions are so 969 
contested and conflicted. To many commentators and institutions such as the 970 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or International Energy Agency (IEA), a 971 
low-carbon transition is a way of rapidly achieving social or policy goals towards addressing 972 
climate change.  To others, it is a way of addressing market failure or capturing co-benefits 973 
such as jobs or improved health attached to low-carbon systems.  However, these 974 
interpretations have often failed to show how processes and pathways of low-carbon 975 
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transitions (mitigation, adaptation) can become intertwined with elite responses and practices 976 
that contribute to inequality, exclusion and injustice.  Low-carbon transitions can become 977 
experiments that socialize risks to the vulnerable, conduits of capital, and tools of 978 
dispossession as much as they can be mechanisms for mitigating emissions or building 979 
human capacity to climate change. Very simply put: elites may approach low-carbon 980 
transitions not as a way to mitigate emissions, but instead as something to experiment and 981 
learn from, something to make money from, or a way to dispossess communities of their 982 
wealth or resources. 983 
Lastly, our study reveals how elites grapple with responses to climate change, how 984 
they view it and attempt to respond to it.  For some elites, climate change offers a 985 
justification for conducting pilots, trials, and experiments, sold on the grounds of urgency but 986 
ultimately transferring risks to those being experimented on and benefits (in the form of data, 987 
knowledge, potential patents, etc.) to the experimenters.  To others, climate change is an 988 
opportunity to create lucrative markets for bonds or reinsurance.  Within these complex and 989 
adaptive pathways, better understanding how elites decide to engage with a phenomenon as 990 
all-encompassing and significant as climate change can help ensure not only that elite 991 
processes are identified, but perhaps understood and then transformed into more equitable 992 
and egalitarian low-carbon futures.  993 
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